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Vertical Restraints and Intellectual
Property Law:
Beyond Antitrust
Michael J. Meurer t
INTRODUCTION
Sales and licenses of intellectual property (IP) and
products incorporating IP often feature restrictions on use,
IP owners have considerable
transfer, and production.1
freedom to fashion such restrictions, but they are constrained
by contract and antitrust law as well as by certain doctrines
within IP law. 2 The appropriate rigor of the constraints on the
freedom of IP owners to market as they choose is hotly
contested within law and economics. 3 Most commentary on
this subject focuses on antitrust oversight, but-at least when
it comes to vertical restraints 4-constraints that are internal to
t Copyright © 2003 by Michael J. Meurer, Associate Professor of Law,
Boston University Law School. I owe thanks to Ron Cass and the participants
at the Symposium on the Interface Between Antitrust and Intellectual
Property Law at the University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See, e.g., Lisa M. Bowman, Court: Network Associates Can't Gag Users,
CNET NEWS.COM, Jan. 17, 2003, at http://news.com/2100-1023-981228.html
("End-user license agreements have become a hot-button issue in the tech
industry as more and more companies try to forge increasingly restrictive
contracts.").
2. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A
Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1817 (1984) (noting that there is no
exemption from criminal laws for patent license terms).
3. See generally Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust
Paradox, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 761 (2002); Richard J. Gilbert & Willard K.
Tom, Is Innovation King at the Antitrust Agencies? The Intellectual Property
Guidelines Five Years Later, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 43 (2001); Willard K. Tom &
Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate
Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (1997).
4. Following antitrust terminology, restraints that affect competitors are
classified as horizontal, and restraints that affect users or suppliers are
classified as vertical. Much of the antitrust analysis of vertical restraints
addresses the effect of restraints on distributors and retailers. See infra note
10. In contrast, this Article mainly addresses the effect of restraints on end-
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patent and copyright law are far more significant.
Furthermore, unlike antitrust, patent and copyright law
facilitate vertical restraints in important ways. This Article
moves beyond antitrust and explores the extensive regulation
5
of vertical restraints within IP law.
There are four. reasons to focus on IP oversight of vertical
restraints separately from antitrust oversight. First, IP law
covers a broader range of vertical restraints. It has broader
coverage because it responds to a larger set of policy concerns
and because it has more regulatory instruments. Antitrust
reaches only certain kinds of vertical restraints that are
especially likely to harm competition.
IP law reaches
anticompetitive restraints through the patent and copyright
misuse doctrines, 6 and it reaches other vertical restraints that
present policy questions usually not addressed in antitrust. IP
law is more versatile than antitrust law because it regulates in
two ways: by specifying entitlements, and by prohibiting
certain contracts or practices. 7
Antitrust is limited to
users.
5. This Article discusses mostly patent and copyright law; space
constraints preclude discussion of the interesting role of trademark law in
regulating vertical restraints.
6. Patent misuse occurs when the patent owner expands the scope or
duration of the patent beyond the rights granted by the patent claims. Misuse
can be purged, the patent is unenforceable until the misuse is purged, and no
damages are allowed. Copyright misuse is patterned after patent misuse. The
law of patent misuse recognizes two types of patent extension. The first type
involves horizontal agreements between competitors who control products or
processes that compete with the patented invention. The second type involves
vertical restrictions on licensees' use. See, e.g., WARD S. BOwMAN, JR., PATENT
AND ANTITRUST LAW 54-56 (1973); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP
AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 20.3 (2002) (distinguishing a vertical
restraint from a horizontal restraint by asking whether competition between
the parties is affected).
7. In addition to the misuse doctrine, IP law regulates vertical restraints
through preemption (see infra text accompanying notes 211, 215-19), the
patent law repair/replace doctrine (see infra Part IV), copyright fair use (see
infra Part II), the copyright public performance right (see infra text
accompanying notes 39-40, 55-57), the brown bag exemption to the Plant
Variety Protection Act (see Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 192
(1995)), the copyright provision governing ties between computers and
computer maintenance (see infra text accompanying notes 128-32), the
copyright mechanical license provision (see infra text accompanying notes 22331), the patent and copyright contributory infringement doctrines (see infra
text accompanying notes 133-40, 147-52), the copyright doctrine stating RAM
copies count as copies under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000) (see infra text
accompanying notes 107-09), the first sale or exhaustion doctrines (see infra
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prohibitions.
Second, the economic analysis of the antitrust-IP conflict
does not provide an adequate normative framework for analysis
of the full range of IP doctrines affecting vertical restraints. 8
Both antitrust and certain IP doctrines (particularly misuse 9 )
are concerned about the potential of vertical restraints to
exclude downstream competitors. 10 But unlike antitrust, IP
doctrines that regulate vertical restraints are often concerned
exclusively with the impact of restraints on end-users. The
proper normative framework resembles consumer protection
law more than antitrust," and the relevant question is how to
resolve the consumer protection-IP conflict.
Specifically,
text accompanying notes 32-37, 63-65), and copyright amendments restricting
record and software rental (see infra note 70 and accompanying text).
8. Most commentators see the misuse doctrine as an anomalous pocket of
quasi-antitrust law that should be assimilated into antitrust.
See
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.2b (stating that misuse occurs when the
patent owner broadens the patent with anticompetitive effect); LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED

HANDBOOK 884 (2000) (favoring identical standards for patent misuse and
antitrust violations in tying cases).
9. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 1.3 ("[N]ot all of the cases that fit
within the intellectual property-antitrust rubric actually involved antitrust at
all. The doctrines of patent (and more recently copyright) misuse serve many
of the same purposes as antitrust law ....).
10. The antitrust law of vertical restraints is mainly concerned with the
impact of restraints on the freedom of downstream firms to choose their own
distribution strategy. See Andy C. M. Chen & Keith N. Hylton, Procompetitive
Theories of Vertical Control, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 573, 575 (1999). Evidence for
this claim is found by examining the leading private antitrust suits addressing
vertical restraints. The plaintiffs are almost always downstream potential or
actual competitors rather than end-users. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 455 (1992) (downstream
competitor); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 721 (1988)
(retailer); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 5 (1984)
(excluded downstream competitor); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
465 U.S. 752, 756 (1984) (distributor); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE-Sylvania
Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 39 (1977) (franchisee). Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley list
three basic competitive concerns that arise from vertical restraints:
foreclosure; raising rivals' costs; and facilitation of collusion. See HOVENKAMP
ET AL., supra note 6, § 20.1.
11. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.5a (noting that antitrust
does not regulate monopoly pricing per se); Paul L. Joskow, TransactionCost
Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies, 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 95, 102-03
(2002) (pointing out that contract and consumer protection laws are better
suited than antitrust law to regulate contractual hazards arising in
nonstandard vertical relationships); Bowman, supra note 1 (stating that the
state court relied on consumer protection law and blocked enforcement of a
software end-user license agreement that prohibited product reviews and
benchmark tests).
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economic analysis of vertical restraints and IP law must
determine whether IP law should aid a seller's attempt to
control: the economic life of a durable good; 12 sharing of
copyrighted works and patented technology; 3 arbitrage that
undermines price discrimination; 14 or a user's decision to exit
the relationship. 5 I do not claim that antitrust judges and
scholars are completely uninterested in these issues-only that
they are peripheral to core antitrust concerns.
Third, antitrust scrutiny of IP protected markets is in a
period of retrenchment.' 6 Recently, some commentators have
argued that the nature of competition in high-tech markets7
justifies a more relaxed antitrust treatment of those markets.'

12. See Malcom B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, Can Post-Chicago
Economics Survive Daubert?, 34 AKRON L. REV. 795, 841-42 (2001)
(commenting on the social cost of market power derived from intellectual
property protection "which reduces welfare by forcing consumers to replace
their durable goods [too] quickly").
13. See Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination,23
CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 132-40 (2001) [hereinafter Meurer, Price Discrimination]
(analyzing whether copyright owners should be allowed to control sharing by
end users); Richard H. Stern, Post-Sale Patent Restrictions After
Mallinckrodt-An Idea in Search of Definition, 5 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 1, 7
(1994) (stating that the Mallinckrodt decision created the doctrine that "a
patentee may restrict use and disposition of patented articles and that
violation of the restriction is patent infringement that [sic] unless the
restriction violates some provision of positive law, such as the antitrust laws").
See generally, Michael J. Meurer, Sharing Copyrighted Works (Oct. 17, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter
Meurer, Sharing].
14. Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley describe price discrimination as a
"rejected concern" of the antitrust law governing vertical restraints. See
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 20.2c.
15. Cf. J.H. Reichman and Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated
Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public
Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 955-57 (1999) (arguing that
users should be able to negotiate licensing terms more freely and in some
cases invoke a public-interest unconscionability defense to avoid certain
terms).
16. See Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust
and the New Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 453, 473 (2001) (expressing concern
that "in the future antitrust may have little or no role in high-technology
industries, especially with respect to claims regarding monopolization of
vertically related markets").
17. Some argue that competition is different in high-tech markets because
market power is transitory in the face of the gale of creative destruction.
Others argue that IP should be expanded and antitrust contracted to provide
greater incentives for innovation. Cf id. at 465 (explaining that the expansion
of IP rights was motivated by a desire to redistribute income in favor of IP
owners).
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In particular, commentators debate whether
vertical restraints
18
connected to IP should be regulated at all.
Fourth, because IP law uses different instruments it
possibly offers more effective regulation of vertical restraints,
and should be used to complement antitrust regulation. 19 IP
law frequently offers two cost advantages over antitrust: less
difficulty fashioning an appropriate remedy, 20 and lower rentseeking costs from opportunistic or anticompetitive litigation. 2 1
Let me illustrate the advantages of IP law by considering the
regulation of price discrimination.
Regulation through
antitrust requires a court to identify anticompetitive price
discrimination, specify unacceptable pricing practices in great
detail, and monitor compliance. In contrast, IP law indirectly
regulates price discrimination by encouraging or discouraging
arbitrage.
For example, the Supreme Court recently
discouraged geographic price discrimination by refusing to
allow copyright owners to block importation of lawful copyright

18. See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 64 (contending that such arrangements
simply maximize legitimate profit attributable to the patent and should not be
condemned through application of the leverage fallacy); HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
supra note 6, §§ 20.3, 20.18, 20.19 (noting that properly defined vertical
restraints rarely violate antitrust). But see Cohen & Noll, supra note 16, at
463-64 (noting that exemptions to antitrust law, including the IP exemption,
have been interpreted narrowly).
19. Antitrust is difficult to administer in hi-tech markets because trials
are slow and the technology is difficult for the court to understand. IP law
shares these administrative costs.
See Joskow, supra note 11, at 99
(explaining that antitrust enforcement agencies do a much better job
performing complex economic analysis than antitrust trial courts).
20. Crafting timely and precise antitrust remedies is a tough job in hightech industries. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 101-04 (2d ed.
2001) (explaining social cost of divestiture as an antitrust remedy); SULLIVAN
& GRIMES, supra note 8, at 77-80 (noting that divestiture and conduct-based
remedies are difficult to implement effectively); Joskow, supra note 11, at 99
(explaining that antitrust remedies may fail to improve efficiency or even
make matters worse); id. at 113-14 (reviewing an FTC study that casts doubt
on the ability of antitrust enforcement agencies to formulate effective
divestiture policies); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and Intellectual Property:
Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
535, 547 (2001) (arguing that remedies should be designed so as not to
undermine innovation, with a brief duration where appropriate, and to assure
access to a bottleneck product or service).
21. For discussion of the rent-seeking costs associated with private
antitrust litigation see POSNER, supra note 20, at 270-76 (supporting feeshifting to successful defendants and restrictions of treble damages in
antitrust suits); William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to
Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 250-51 (1985) ("[T]he social costs of
rent-seeking protectionism can be very high.").

1876

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1871

protected products into the United States. 22 The Court could
have reached either decision, and thereby promoted or
discouraged price discrimination without imposing much of an
administrative burden. Rent-seeking through litigation is more
of a problem with antitrust regulation of price discrimination
because any rule determining what sort of price discrimination
is anticompetitive is likely' to be quite uncertain. In contrast,
the rule about importation of copyrighted works is relatively
certain. Uncertainty about liability encourages opportunistic
antitrust suits and possibly chills legitimate pricing decisions
by sellers. 23 Concern about administrative costs and rentseeking pushed the courts to restrict antitrust oversight of
vertical restraints. 24 IP law can be used to regulate vertical
restraints more extensively because it better avoids these
25
costs.
This Article is structured to discuss six types of vertical
restraints: restrictions on the field or location of use;
restrictions on sharing; control over the frequency of use;
restrictions
on repair
and
modification;
packaging
requirements; and impediments to a buyer's decision to exit its
relationship with a seller. Each part explains how the restraint
is regulated by IP law. Where appropriate, the antitrust
treatment of the restraint is compared to the IP treatment.
Finally, the policy issues presented by each restraint are
described. The conclusion compares the effectiveness of IP law
and antitrust law as instruments for regulating vertical
restraints.

22. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, 152 (1998).
23.

signals.

See Joskow, supra note 11, at 98-99. Antitrust policy must send clear

It is designed to deter bad behavior-not to "scrutinize, screen, or

approve firm behavior or market structures." Id. at 98.

24. See id. at 98 (arguing that antitrust law should not be used to regulate
most market imperfections because of the high transaction costs associated
with such "micromanagement"). Measures that control rent-seeking litigation
sometimes discourage too much socially desirable litigation.
See also
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 8, at 910-13 (noting benefits of private

antitrust enforcement).
25. In contrast to antitrust law, IP law creates a temptation for IP owners
to engage in anticompetitive litigation-suits with little merit and the

potential to discourage legitimate new competitors. See Michael J. Meurer,
Controlling Opportunisticand Anticompetitive Intellectual PropertyLitigation,
45 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2003).
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I. TYPE OF USE
In markets protected by IP, sellers often segment their
buyers based on line of business, location, field of technology, or
whether the use is not-for-profit. 26 They implement this
segmentation through contract terms that specify allowable
uses. The usual goal of this marketing strategy is price
discrimination. 27 Price discrimination occurs when a seller
charges different prices to different classes of customers even
though the marginal cost of serving the different classes is the
same. 28 For example, DuPont 'imposed a field of use restriction
and charged different prices for a patented synthetic fiber
depending on the end use intended by the customers. 29 Price
discrimination allows the seller to increase profit by tailoring
prices to different customer classes that have different
preferences.
Whether price discrimination is profitable depends on the
cost of sorting customers into appropriate classes and the cost
of blocking arbitrage. In this context, arbitrage occurs when a
customer in a class that is supposed to pay a high price is able
to obtain a product or license at a low price. A common source
of arbitrage is the resale market-a favored customer
purchases at a low price and resells to a disfavored customer.
Arbitrage also occurs when a customer violates a use restriction
and the seller fails to stop the violation.
Price discriminating sellers try to block arbitrage by
restricting resale and by restricting the type of use allowed by
favored customers. Sellers can sue users for breach of contract
when they violate license restrictions. Various IP law doctrines
26. In ProCD Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996), the
court upheld a consumer use restriction in the face of a copyright preemption
claim. ProCD, however, is more of a horizontal restraint case than a vertical
restraint case. The goal of the lawsuit was to stop reproduction of data after
the defendant offered a competing telephone directory on the Internet. Id. at
1450.
27. See generally S. J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price
Discrimination,in 8 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF
PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 181, 182 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr.
eds., 1986) (describing price discrimination in the market for academic
journals); Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at 80-90 (describing
the pervasive role of copyright law in both facilitating and impeding price
discrimination).
28. See Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination,Personal Use and Piracy:
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 869-71 (1997).
29. See Akzo v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1488
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
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increase the profitability of price discrimination by further
discouraging arbitrage. If the act of arbitrage also violates an
IP right, then sellers can bring more potent infringement
30
claims in addition to contract claims against arbitrageurs.
Furthermore, the IP claims are available against arbitrageurs
who are strangers to the seller, thereby overcoming the privity
31
limitation on contract claims.
IP law generally facilitates restrictions on types of use, but
its effect on resale restrictions is mixed-sometimes facilitating
and sometimes discouraging resale restrictions. The baseline
rule in patent and copyright law gives buyers the right to
transfer products that they purchase. IP owners can avoid this
rule, called the first sale or exhaustion doctrine, by leasing
32
rather than selling their products.
Resale across national borders is treated distinctly from
domestic resale. Copyright provides an importation right but it
is limited by the first sale doctrine. 33 The copyright owner can
block unauthorized imports, but cannot block authorized copies
that are imported back into the United States. 34 This forces a
copyright owner to rely on contract law to block arbitrage
against geographic price discrimination.
Trademark law
provides similar treatment of so-called gray market goods. 35 A
United States trademark holder may bar the importation of
goods bearing the same trademark when manufactured by a
foreign manufacturer but cannot stop importation of goods
30. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
31. See Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Sinkers Corp., 177 F.3d 1343, 1347-48
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (discussing requirements for third party liability for sales that
violate a PVPA certificate); David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of
Contract into Expand, 87 CAL. L. REV. 17, 35 (1999) (discussing copyright

issues in the context of software copying).
32. See Communications Groups Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
527 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1998) (characterizing a negotiated
software agreement as a lease even though the document described the
agreement as a license); Joseph P. Liu, Owning DigitalCopies: Copyright Law
and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1301-02

(2001) (discussing resale and the right of alienation). Resale is not a problem
for IP owners who license information rather than sell a product because they
can preclude any transfer in the license. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing
in the Contemporary Information Economy, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POLY 99, 119
n.39 (2002) (comparing sales, leases, and licenses).

33. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, 138-40 (1998).
34.

See id. at 145.

35.

See Kmart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286-91 (1988).
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made under the control of the domestic trademark holder. 36 In
contrast, the Patent Act prohibits any importation of a
patented product into the United States, and greatly facilitates
37
geographic price discrimination.
Patent law broadly facilitates restrictions on type of use
while copyright gives more limited support. A patent owner
has the right to exclude others from use of a patented
invention. The predominant view in patent law states that
because the patent owner can exclude all use, the statute gives
an implied right to grant permission for some uses and still sue
the licensee for infringement if she engages in an unauthorized
use. 38 Copyright law enumerates certain uses that are the
exclusive right of the copyright owner. Most relevant for this
discussion of vertical restraints is the public performance
right.39 This right facilitates price discrimination in the movie
and music markets between home users and buyers who want
to engage in a public performance, for example, exhibiting a
40
movie in a theater or broadcasting music on the radio.
Compared to IP law, antitrust oversight of price
discrimination is relatively passive. Antitrust plaintiffs had
some success in the 1960s. In one notable case the owner of a
patent on shrimp peeling machinery leased machines to Gulf
Coast shrimp companies for half the rental rate that it charged
Pacific Coast shrimp companies. 4 1 The Fifth Circuit found this
geographic price discrimination violated section 5 of the FTC
Act because it injured competition in the shrimp canning

36.

See id. at 292. The trend in Europe favors gray markets and opposes

the use of intellectual property to facilitate international price discrimination.
See S.O. Spinks, Exclusive Dealing, Discrimination,and Discounts Under EC
Competition Law, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 641, 666-67 (2000).
37. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2002).
Section 271(g) also prohibits
importation of a product made with a patented process, even if the process was
used outside of the United States with permission. See Ajinomoto Co. v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 228 F.3d 1338, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert denied,
532 U.S. 1019 (2001).
38. See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 140-42 (arguing that an absolute right
to exclude use implies a right to impose any conditions on the use of a

patented invention). But see Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1846 (arguing against
this view and claiming it "has gradually fallen into disfavor in the patentantitrust context"). The implied right is made explicit regarding restrictions
on location of use. See 35 U.S.C. § 261.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000) gives music composition copyright owners

the right to control public performance of their music.
40.
41.

See Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at 109-16.
See Lapeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117, 118 (5th Cir. 1966).
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business. 42 Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley doubt the case
would have come out the same way today.43 They review recent
cases and conclude that antitrust law permits price
discrimination in patent licenses, but the sale of patented goods
is still governed by the Robinson-Patman Act. 44 The RobinsonPatman Act is also occasionally applied to goods that
incorporate copyrighted expression, like books and video
cassettes,4645 but it has not had much impact on IP protected
markets.
Patent and copyright law permit contract restrictions
based on location and type of use, but patent law goes further
than copyright law to encourage sellers to impose those
restrictions by creating a strong importation right and a broad
right to control use of a patented invention. To assess the
economic significance of these differences one needs to examine
the social welfare effects of these restraints. A common view
among antitrust commentators is that sellers segment47
customer classes to achieve some distributional efficiency.
The same argument is pressed by copyright and trademark
owners who oppose importation of gray market goods.4 8 They
argue exclusive territories are established to encourage
investment by distributors in local goodwill and service. 49 The
empirical evidence suggests, however, that gray markets arise

42. Id.
(expressing
43. See
44. See

at 121.
But see HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.5
doubt that this case is good law today).
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.5.
id. § 23.4. Courts have rejected claims that price discrimination

constitutes a form of misuse. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694
F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982) (holding that a patentee is entitled to use price
discrimination to maximize its profit); HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6,
§ 3.3b7.
45. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 13.5.
46. See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV 1203, 1255 (1998); Meurer, supra note 28, at 871.
47. See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 61-62, 64-139 (arguing that use

restrictions in patent licenses promote efficiency).
48.

In Quality King Distributors,Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., the

copyright owner sold shampoo with copyrighted labels on the shampoo bottles.
523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998). The shampoo manufacturer argued that exclusive

geographic markets were justified because of the divergent marketing
strategies used in the United States and abroad. Id. at 138-39.
49. See Nancy T. Gallini & Aidan Hollis, A ContractualApproach to the
Gray Market, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 4-5 (1999). Such an efficiency

justification was raised by the copyright owner in Quality King, but it was not
very persuasive. 523 U.S. at 138-39, 152.
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to arbitrage geographic price discrimination. 50
Thus, the
relevant policy issue is whether IP law should encourage
geographic, field of use, and similar forms of price
discrimination.
IP scholars have developed a recent fascination with the
policy effects of price discrimination in IP-protected markets. 51
Some embrace price discrimination because it has the potential
to increase profit and the incentive to create, and
simultaneously increase output. Others are skeptical because
of its distributional implications, or because it may actually
cause output to fall. 52 It is possible that patent law's greater
solicitude for price discrimination is explained by the
perception that the extra profit from price discrimination is
especially valuable as an incentive to invent (specifically to
invent pharmaceuticals, an industry that practices extensive
price discrimination 53 ). Perhaps the same incentive argument
is not as persuasive in copyright protected markets.
Two other policy considerations are important in shaping
optimal IP policy. First, any decision to expand the scope of IP
rights increases the social costs associated with opportunistic
and anticompetitive IP litigation. Converting a simple contract

50. See Gallini & Hollis, supra note 49, at 6 (explaining that empirical
evidence shows that price discrimination is probably the most important cause
of gray market transactions); David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel
Imports, Demand Dispersion, and InternationalPrice Discrimination, 37 J.
INT'L ECON. 167, 172-74 (1994) (reviewing empirical evidence and concluding
that arbitrage against price discrimination is a significant source of gray
market activity).
51. See Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in
Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); James Boyle, Cruel,
Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital
Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright
and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); Fisher, supra note 40;
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1661, 1742-43 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price
Discrimination:Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998);
F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 727-32 (2001); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483,
630-34 (1996); Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13; Meurer, supra
note 28.
52. See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1873-78 (discussing the effect on social
welfare of price discrimination by a patent owner).
53. See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groombridge, ParallelTrade in the
PharmaceuticalIndustry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and
Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 194-96
(1999).
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claim into a patent or copyright infringement claim gives the IP
owner significant strategic advantages because of the threat of
preliminary and permanent injunction, fee-shifting, and treble
damages for willful infringement. 54 Furthermore, IP rights can
be asserted against innocent strangers (perhaps importers) who
might be vulnerable to an opportunistic IP suit. These rentseeking costs need to be balanced against any incentive benefit
before IP rights are expanded to support price discrimination.
Second, IP law can channel sellers into choosing a socially
beneficial form of price discrimination rather than a socially
harmful form. 55 Copyright's public performance right serves
this function. If the public performance right were deleted
from the statute, music and movie producers would find
another, more costly, way to discriminate between buyers
intending to publicly perform the work, and buyers intending
only private use. One possibility would be a very high initial
sales price followed after a significant delay with a lower sales
price targeted at home users. Another possibility would be
vertical integration into movie exhibition or radio broadcast.
The public performance right allows discrimination and avoids
the high implementation costs associated with the other
strategies.
A related point is that copyright can shape the
distributional effects of price discrimination by building
exemptions into a right.
Section 110 provides various
exemptions to the public performance right to promote
educational and nonprofit performances, 56 and other
exemptions that might be explained by relatively high
transaction costs compared to the value of the public
performance to the user. 57 Thus, copyright effectively supports
price discrimination to the bulk of users intending a public
performance, while sheltering certain users to advance various
policy goals.
Appropriately, antitrust regulation of type of use restraints
is quite limited. Hovenkamp contends that "the costs of
preventing price discrimination without any accompanying
exclusionary conduct would almost certainly outweigh any
benefits, particularly if the market is competitive or

54.

See Meurer, supra note 25.

55. See Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at 103-05.
56.
57.

See 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2000).
See Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at 114-16.
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oligopolistic." 58 The basic difficulty with the Robinson-Patman
approach is that it puts courts in an uncomfortable position as
price regulators. In contrast, IP law works in the background
59
by encouraging or discouraging arbitrage.
II. LENDING AND PRIVATE REPRODUCTION
Copyright law has been racked by controversies regarding
the rights of buyers and sellers with regard to sharing. Even
use of the term "sharing" is controversial. 60 I use it to describe
various types of coalitions formed by consumers for
consumption of copyrighted works. I define sharing as any
activity such that a single copy of a work provides utility to a
small number of end users in addition to the purchaser. This
part addresses two common
sources of sharing: lending and
61
private reproduction.
Copyright law displays much ambivalence toward sharing.
It would seem that private reproduction runs afoul of the
reproduction right specified in § 106(1), but many forms of
private reproduction are privileged by statutory exemptions or
the fair use defense. 62 It would also seem that buyers are
permitted to lend copies that they purchase under the first sale
doctrine, but that right is limited by amendments that preclude
commercial lending of music and software. 63 Regulation of
sharing is further complicated by enforcement problems.
Copyright law recognizes the difficulty of enforcement against
small scale sharing, and allows copyright owners to sue parties
who contribute to copyright infringement by providing
reproduction technology or otherwise facilitating illicit
64
sharing.
Library lending is the oldest significant source of sharing.
The first sale doctrine gives libraries the right to lend books

58. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 14.5a (2d ed. 1999).
59. One important role is prohibition of territorial or field of use
restrictions that promote cartelization. See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 1879.
60. See Michael J. Madison, Sharing and Copyright: Language and

Practice (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
61. See Meurer, Sharing, supra note 13.
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (fair use doctrine); id. § 108 (library
exemption); id. § 117 (archival copies of software).

63. See id. § 109(b)(1)(A).
64. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 434-42 (1984).
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and other copyrighted material in their collections. 65 But the
nature of library sharing may soon change drastically as
libraries incorporate more digital content into their collections.
The contracts governing the transactions for digital content
usually include terms that restrict transfer. 66 The copyright
owners argue that the first sale doctrine does not apply to
digital transactions because they license rather than sell their
products. 67 The Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act and some cases approve of this theory. 68 In other cases,
courts characterize the purported licenses as sales and refuse
69
to enforce the resale restrictions.
The music and software industries obtained copyright
amendments that bar unauthorized commercial music and
software rental. 70
A puzzling contrast in United States
copyright law is that commercial video rental is permitted
without permission from movie copyright owners. 71 The movie
industry was not successful when it lobbied for an amendment
comparable to the amendments obtained by the music and
software industries. 72 In many other countries, copyright law
does give copyright owners control over movie rental. 73
The introduction of reproduction technology to consumer
markets made private reproduction another significant source
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (first sale doctrine). Many European countries
give the copyright owner a lending right that provides a fee based on the
volume of lending activity. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Reproduction of Protected
Works for University Research or Teaching, 39 J. COPYRIGHT SOC Y 181, 196
(1992) (describing Nordic country photocopy license fees set as a price per page
copied, as "a lump sum payment from each user, group" or occasionally as
lump sum per inhabitant or per student).
66.
Bowman, supra note 1.
67. See Nimmer, supra note 32, at 115-17, 129-32.
68. Id.
69. See Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d. 1218,
1230-31 (D. Utah 1997) (refusing to enforce shrink-wrap term that purported
to limit the first sale doctrine); Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers &
Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208, 212-13 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (refusing to apply first
sale doctrine to software license); Nimmer et al., supra note 31, at 34-40.
70. Recorded music cannot be rented without permission from the
copyright owner.
See Record Rental Amendment of 1984, 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(b)(1)(A). The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990
prohibits unauthorized rental of many types of software. See id.
71. Robert A. Rosenbloum, The Rental Rights Directive: A Step in the
Right and Wrong Directions, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 547, 579 (1995).
72. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.12[BI [71 [a] n.119 (2002); Rosenbloum, supra note 71, at 578.
73. See Rosenbloum, supra note 71, at 551.
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of sharing. The photocopier added a new dimension to librarybased sharing; now patrons can reproduce a portion of a text in
addition to borrowing a text. Much photocopying does not
infringe copyright because of the fair use doctrine or because of
statutory exemptions for libraries. 74 The fair use doctrine is a
multi-factor balancing test that allows copying that achieves
certain socially desirable purposes provided the effect on
copyright owners' incentives are not too severe. 75 Spontaneous,
76
noncommercial, and academic photocopying tends to be fair.
Systematic and commercial photocopying tends to be
77
infringing.
Consumers share music and video by making and
exchanging private copies. Such sharing has become routine,
but the first important case on the question was hotly disputed
and decided by a five to four vote in the Supreme Court. In
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court
held private copying of television programs may be a fair use. 78
Specifically, it is fair use for consumers to videotape television
programs so they can view them at some time after the
broadcast. 79 Many other countries initially found such copying
was infringing, and then revised their copyright statutes to
allow private copying, but they also collect taxes on recording
media and devices and give the tax revenue to copyright
80
owners.
74. Extensive photocopying of medical journals at the National Institutes
of Health and the National Library of Medicine was judged to be a fair use in
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd per
curiam 420 U.S. 376 (1975), by an equally divided Court.
75. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
450-51 (1984).
76. See Nicole B. Casarez, Deconstructingthe FairUse Doctrine: The Cost
of Personal and Workplace Copying After American Geophysical Union v.
Texaco, Inc., 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 641, 653, 657, 70515 (1996).
77. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931-32 (2d
Cir. 1994).
78. 464 U.S. at 447-56.
79. The Court approved of "time-shifting" as a purpose deserving
protection under the fair use doctrine. Id. at 454-55. There has been
relatively little written by United States courts but a great deal written by law
professors that approves of time-shifting and other personal uses as fair use.
See, e.g., Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing:Personal Use in
Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1181-89 (2001) (advocating a statutory
personal use privilege).
80. Generally, European nations have copyright provisions that permit
private copying but also impose taxes on copying equipment and media that
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The much publicized Napster case indicates some of the
limits on personal reproduction rights.8' The Ninth Circuit
found that personal reproduction and exchange of digital music
files over an anonymous Internet file-sharing service is not fair
use.82 Additionally, the court ruled that the company Napster
was indirectly liable for copyright infringement because it
provided software and services that facilitated unlawful filesharing. 83 In contrast, Sony was not liable for the sale of video
recorders. 84 Although video recorders can be used to make
unlawful copies, since they are capable of a substantial noninfringing use, there is no contributory infringement. 85
The antitrust approach to regulation of sharing asks
whether vertical restraints on private reproduction and
transfer cause anticompetitive effects to distributors or
potential competitors in downstream markets. The answer in
most of the interesting cases is clearly no, thus there is not
much of a role for antitrust.86 In contrast, economic analysis of
are paid to copyright owners. See Edmund L. Andrews, FightingFree Music,
Europeans Take Aim at Personal Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at Al
(reporting that many European countries impose copyright fees on audio and
videocassette recorders and blank tapes). For example, the taxes collected on
blank audiotapes and audio recording equipment are paid to music copyright
owners. See Eugen Ulmer & Hans Hugo von Rauscher, Germany (Federal
Republic), in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 422
(Stephen M. Stewart & Hamish Sandison eds., 2d ed. 1989). Germany taxes
photocopy machines and each copy by libraries or schools to cover copying
losses to copyright owners. Id. at 422-23. Spain imposes a tax on equipment
and media to pay for private copying.
Edward Thompson, Spain, in
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 367 supra. Many
countries embrace the notion that "personal" use of copyrighted works is
outside of the scope of copyright protection.
See COMPUTER SCI. &
TELECOMMS. BD., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 129 (2000).
81. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d. 1004, 1015-28 (9th Cir.
2001).
82. Id. at 1018-19.
83. Id. at 1020-24.
84. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984).
85. Id.
86. Antitrust does not directly regulate restraints on sharing, but it may
have some indirect effect. Companies that facilitate sharing have been
targeted with contributory infringement suits and have responded with
antitrust claims. See John Borland, Kazaa Strikes Back at Hollywood, Labels,
CNET NEWS.COM Jan. 28, 2003, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023982344.html. The owner of Kazaa, the music file-sharing service, sued
members of the music industry for copyright misuse and antitrust violations
and is seeking to bar enforcement of their music copyrights. Id. The claim is
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copyright law asks what pattern of rights relating to sharing
maximizes expected total surplus; This question must be
answered by copyright law (at least implicitly) because the law
must set some pattern of entitlements.
Optimal policy toward sharing tries to satisfy two goals
that are often in conflict: provide an appropriate incentive for
the creation of copyrighted works and maximize total surplus
from dissemination of these products once they are created. 87 A
policy that always forbids sharing without permission is
probably not optimal. It does have the desirable effect of
maximizing the incentive for creation. But a right to share
may be socially desirable because the current incentive for
creation is too large, or because giving users the right to share
causes total surplus to grow significantly relative to the loss of
profit-based incentive.8 8 Normally, when sharing raises both
profit and ex post surplus it is socially desirable and should be
encouraged, and similarly, it should be discouraged when it
depresses both profit and ex post surplus. 89 When sharing
erodes profit and raises ex post surplus the optimal policy is
hard to determine, but encouraging sharing is more likely to be
socially desirable when the surplus gain is large and the profit
loss is small.90
The effect of sharing on profit depends to a large extent on
based on the music industry's alleged refusal to provide copy-protected music
files for distribution over the Kazaa network. Id. The district court judge in
the Napster case found evidence that the music industry might have violated

the antitrust laws in the market for digital music distribution. Id. The
Department of Justice is also investigating music industry activities in
markets for digital music. Id.
87. Sony, 464 U.S. at 450-51; Meurer, Sharing, supra note 13.
88. The Ninth Circuit in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am.,
659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981), and the dissent in the Supreme Court
decision that reversed the Ninth Circuit, see 464 U.S. 417, 475 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), argued that the fair use doctrine should not apply

to reproductive uses of copyrighted works that enable some types of sharing.
The majority rejected this view stating that even some unauthorized timeshifting is not infringing and that fair-use requires a balancing of interests

which showed that the social benefits outweighed the costs. 464 U.S. at 448,
455.
89. This statement does not hold if current incentives for creation are too
large.

If so, then it might be socially desirable to reduce profit (and the

accompanying incentive to create) even if that also means reducing total
surplus. See Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at 95-97.

90. Kaplow looks at the ratio of total surplus change to profit change
when formulating an optimal patent policy. See Kaplow, supra note 2, at
1829-39. Fisher follows the same approach when analyzing the fair use
doctrine. See Fisher, supra note 46, at 1706-17.

1888

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1871

how sharing affects demand for the copyrighted work. Sharing
affects demand by reducing the number of buyers, increasing
the valuations that buyers assign to the product, and lowering
or avoiding transaction costs. Valuations rise because most
buyers value the opportunity to share in addition to the
opportunity to consume the product directly. 9 1 In some cases,
sharing opens the market to new users who otherwise would be
excluded because of transaction costs. Finally, sharing may
either facilitate or impede the seller's effort to sort consumers
92
into separate groups and charge discriminatory prices.
Optimal copyright regulation of sharing must balance the
rights of users and sellers. Sellers would be happiest with
complete control over sharing. Then, they could authorize
lending, private reproduction, and other activities that
contribute to sharing if and only if they increased sellers' profit.
Buyers, however, should have the right to share without
permission when the sellers' profit incentive is misaligned with
the social interest in maximizing total surplus. This might
occur when users are excluded from a market by high
transaction costs, 93 when sharing undermines inefficient price
discrimination, 94 or when buyer coalitions exert countervailing
market power that offsets seller market power and increases
95
output.
These policy considerations are critical to a proper fair use
91. In some markets, valuations also rise because of consumption
externalities. A consumption externality implies that a buyer's direct utility
rises when the number of other consumers using the product rises. See
Kathleen R. Conner & Richard P. Rumelt, Software Piracy: An Analysis of
ProtectionStrategies, 37 MGMT. SCI. 125, 133, 136 (1991) (noting that sharing
may increase profit because of network effects); Lisa Takeyama, The Welfare
Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of Intellectual Property in the
Presence of Demand Network Externalities, 62 J. INDUS. ECON. 155, 158-62
(1994) (arguing that sharing may increase profit due to high-valuation
customers).
92. A subtler but equally important concern is the impact of sharing on
the dispersion of buyers' valuations. Increasing dispersion tends to increase
inefficiency. Sharing sometimes makes the valuations of potential buyers
more homogenous and smoothes demand; other times it increases
heterogeneity and the dispersion of demand. See Yannis Bakos et al., Shared
Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117, 127-32 (1999). Sharing might also be
an efficient method of distributing a good. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D.
Willig, On the Optimal Provision of Journals Qua Sometimes Shared Goods,
68 AM. ECON. REV. 324, 325 (1978).
93. See Gordon, supra note 51, at 1387.
94. See Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at 12.
95. See Meurer, Sharing, supra note 13, at 21-22.
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analysis of sharing. Fair use balances four factors: purpose;
nature of the work; amount of the work used; and market
effect. 96 Fair use addresses the impact of sharing on incentives
for creation through the second and fourth factors. Courts
evaluate the nature of a work to see whether it requires strong
incentives for creation, 97 and the market effect to identify the
impact of sharing on profit. 98 Together these factors lead to a
judgment about the impact of sharing on incentives to create.
Fair use addresses the impact of sharing on ex post total
surplus through the first factor. For example, courts recognize
that private copying can be justified as a way to avoid
transaction costs. 99 Courts have not considered whether
disruption of inefficient price discrimination or creation of
countervailing market power are purposes favoring fair usebut the open-ended nature of the balancing test would permit
this sort of analysis.
III. FREQUENCY OF USE
Sellers are motivated to control frequency of use because it
aids price discrimination. 10 0 Buyers who use a product more
frequently are likely to have a higher valuation and be willing
to pay more. Ideally a seller would just ask prospective buyers
how frequently they plan to use a product, and then charge
more to high frequency users. Of course, buyers may not know
the answer to that question at the time of purchase, and they
have an incentive to understate their planned usage.' 0 ' Thus,
IP owners employ several different strategies to monitor and
control frequency of use.
One approach is to control frequency of use directly
through contract. A seller could specify an increasing schedule
of prices associated with an increasing frequency of permissible
use. 10 2 Contractual use restrictions are difficult to enforce
96.
97.
98.

See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (fair use doctrine).
See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 72, § 13.05[A] [2] [a].
Id. § 13.05[A] [4].

99. Id. § 13.05[E][3][c][iii].
100. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 146-48
(1988).

101. Id. at 143 (noting the incentive compatibility problem).
102.

Digital technology makes this possible for digital content, and it is

possible this marketing approach will become common in the not too distant
future. See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated
Rights Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557,
565-67 (1998); Meurer, supra note 28, at 878-79. One attempt with digital
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because it is difficult to detect violations. 10 3 IP law bolsters
frequency of use restrictions by adding infringement claims and
10 4
strong IP remedies to the breach of contract claims.
Infringement claims are well grounded in patent law because
the patent owner has broad control over use.105 Copyright law
does not offer a comparably broad use right 10 6 but in some
important settings unauthorized use is infringing. Computers
(and other consumer electronic devices) usually make a
temporary copy of digital content or software during use. Even
though temporary, such a copy may be infringing. 10 7 Thus, a
digital copyright owner can sue a buyer who violates a
frequency of use restriction for breach of contract, and also for
copyright infringement because of the unauthorized temporary
reproductions. Copyright law imposes two important limits on
these infringement claims. Section 117 gives software owners
the right to make copies as an essential step in using a
program, 0 8 and the copyright misuse doctrine might prevent a
seller from circumventing the first sale doctrine. 109
More commonly, sellers control frequency of use indirectly
through the sale of some complementary product that is used
video failed to win consumer acceptance. See Joel Brinkley, Few Tears are
Shed as Divx Joins the 8-Track, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at G6.
103. See Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential Facilities, 1991
BYU L. REV. 1243, 1260-61 (1991).
104. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (ruling that violation of the single use requirement was patent
infringement as well as contract breach).
105. See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 142-46 (reading exhaustion cases to
permit patent restrictions on use after sale as long as the restrictions are
explicit).
106. Rights under copyright law are limited to the reproduction,
adaptation, distribution, performance, and display rights confined in § 106.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
107. See MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518-19
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the copy of software created in RAM (random
access memory) during execution is sufficiently fixed to qualify for copyright
protection).
108. 17 U.S.C. § 117. The MA! court held that a licensee is not an owner so
§ 117 did not apply. See 991 F.2d at 517. Courts often reject this approach for
mass-market software. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
109. See Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law
Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to
Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 874-75 (2000); cf. Julie E. Cohen &
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89
CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (2001) (the exhaustion and implied license doctrines are
meaningless in the software context if making a RAM copy or other temporary
copy amounts to an infringing "making").
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with the IP protected product. Sellers require buyers to
purchase the complementary product (1) through a tying
contract, (2) because of product design, or (3) by threat of an
infringement suit against a competing supplier. The classic
illustration of contractual tying and price discrimination comes
0
from the antitrust tying case IBM Corp. v. United States."1
IBM leased patented tabulator machines on the condition that
the lessee purchase all of the punch cards needed for use in the
machines from IBM. 1"'
Punch card purchases measured
frequency of use. Rather than charging a rental rate that
varied directly with frequency of use, IBM charged a premium
over the competitive price for punch cards, and thereby
indirectly collected a rental rate that increased with the
frequency of use.1 12 IBM could have implemented essentially
the same pricing scheme by installing a counter on each
machine that recorded the number of cards processed, or by
requiring lessees to record and report how many cards they
used (or some other measure of frequency of use). No doubt
they chose the punch card tie because it was less costly and
13
more reliable.'
Antitrust law treats tying contracts as per se illegal, but
actually imposes a relatively mild check. A tying contract is
unlawful if there are truly separate tied and tying products, the
seller has market power in the tying product market, and there
are anticompetitive effects in the tied product market.1 4 Older
cases like IBM found ties that appear to implement price
discrimination to be unlawful, 1 5 but recent courts have been
quite tolerant. "[T]he great majority of decisions conclude that
the simple fact that a tie causes price discrimination is not

110. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
111. Id. at 134.
112. Id. at 139. The same type of price discrimination was practiced in
Motion PicturePatents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Movie
projectors were tied to film, and the patent owner derived most of its profit
from the sale of film. Id. at 506-07.
113. A similar fact pattern was described in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 489-90 (1942). The lease of a patented canning
machine was tied to the sale of salt tablets. Id. Salt sales meter intensity of
use of the canning machine. Id. Perhaps the lessor wanted to control the salt
used in the leased machines to prevent harm caused by inferior salt.
114. The plaintiff must also show evidence of actual coercion that forced
the buyer to accept the tie, and that the tied product market involves
interstate commerce. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 58, § 10.1.
115. See IBM, 298 U.S. at 140.
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sufficient for illegality." 16 The patent and copyright misuse
doctrines evaluate
tying claims essentially the same way as
7
11
antitrust law.

Sellers can use product design to implement a
technological rather than a contractual tie. This approach
works when the seller offers a system containing two
components that interact through an interface that the seller
designs so it is difficult for a third party to make a compatible

tied product. The tied component is consumed by users and
must be replaced frequently. The seller monitors frequency of
use through sales of the consumable component. For example,

a medical device manufacturer named Bard apparently used
the sale of biopsy needles to measure the frequency of use of a
gun that inserted the needles. 118 Bard violated § 2 of the
Sherman Act by changing the interface between the gun and
the needles to exclude other needle manufacturers.1 19 Section 2
oversight is significantly limited by the requirement that the
defendant possess monopoly power, 120 21and by antitrust courts'
reluctance to meddle with innovation. 1
IP law regulates the development and creation of product

interfaces and thereby facilitates or discourages product design
based tying. Patent and trade secret law protect product
interfaces. A seller can block all use of a patented interface,
116. See HOVENKAMPETAL., supra note 6, § 21.2e.
117. See Morton Salt Co., 314 U.S. at 493 (attempting to block enforcement
of the patent by alleged infringer's invocation of the doctrine of patent misuse);
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.1 (noting that antitrust and patent
misuse are closely linked). Patent misuse is not the same as the equitable
doctrine of unclean hands for two reasons: The patentee loses both injunctive
remedies and damages and the whole patent is unenforceable against any
infringer. The Federal Circuit established three categories that apply to
misuse analysis. See Virginia Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Corp., 133 F.3d 860,
869 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Certain restraints (tying and extending the patent term)
are per se misuse. Other restraints are per se legal under § 271(d). Restraints
that do not fall into the first two categories either do not broaden "the scope of
the patent claims and thus cannot constitute patent misuse," or do broaden
the scope of the patent claims and may constitute misuse if they have an
anticompetitive effect under a rule of reason analysis. Id.
118. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (noting that Bard excluded competitors from the market for replacement
needles).
119. Id.
120. See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 919 (10th Cir. 1975).
121. See, e.g., Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979); Telex Corp., 510 F.2d at 933. But see C.R. Bard Inc. v. M3 Systems, 157
F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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but reverse engineering is allowed if the interface is protected
as a trade secret. 122 Reverse engineering of software interfaces
requires making a copy of the interface software. Sellers have
tried to use copyright law to block the reverse engineering, but
courts have denied infringement claims under the fair use
doctrine. 123 Finally, sellers have had mixed
success with
124
contracts that precluded reverse engineering.
Another, more doubtful, strategy for protecting a product
interface is a claim based on section 1201(a) of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). That section creates a
right prohibiting circumvention of means that control access to
copyrighted works. 2 5 Recently, a printer manufacturer filed a
lawsuit in which it seeks to use the DMCA to control the
market for replacement ink cartridges. 26 The claim has some
plausibility because the software incorporated in the interface
is copyrightable subject matter, but there is a strong argument
that the lawsuit improperly extends the scope of copyright to
the market for replacement ink cartridges
and therefore
27
violates the misuse doctrine or antitrust law.1
122. See Telex Corp., 510 F.2d at 933 (noting that trade secret law protects
interfaces).

123. The leading case is Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510
(9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff Sega makes and sells the Genesis console and video
game cartridges. Id. at 1514. Accolade makes game cartridges that run on
different types of consoles. Id. Sega licenses independent game makers but
did not license Accolade. Id. Accolade reverse engineered the Sega video

game programs to discover the requirements for compatibility and then made
compatible game cartridges. Id. The court held that copying and disassembly
to discover functional compatibility requirements constitutes a fair use. Id. at
1521.

124. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 302 F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2002); DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th Cir.
1996); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 971-72 (4th Cir. 1990).
In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988), the
court applied § 117(1) to reverse engineering. In other cases, courts have read
§ 117 to apply only to temporary copies associated with approved uses of the
software. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 109, at 33 (arguing that the exhaustion
doctrine should preempt license term that precludes reverse engineering); id
at 35-36 (contending that patent misuse should apply to attempts to prevent
reverse engineering in software license).
125. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).

126. Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors at 6, Lexmark, Int'l Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc,, (E.D. Ky 2003) (No. 02-571-KSF); David
Becker, Lexmark Wins Injunction in DMCA Case, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 27,

2003,
(noting
that
preliminary
injunction
was
http://news.com.com/2100-1028-990501.html?tag=fdtop.

granted)

at

127. See Dan L. Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, 48 UCLA L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
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The final approach to controlling frequency of use relies on
the threat of IP suits against competing suppliers of the tied
product. An example in copyright law is presented in MA!
Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. 128 MAI sold computers
containing their copyrighted operating system. 129 They tied
maintenance service to the computer by suing Peak, a third
party maintenance provider, for copyright infringement. 130 The
infringement claim was based on the temporary copy that was
made when Peak technicians turned on an MAI computer and
the operating system was loaded into RAM.' 31 An amendment
to the Copyright Act partially overruled this case by adding
§ 117(c), which allows a software owner or lessee to authorize a
RAM copy for the purpose of hardware maintenance or
32
repair. 1
Patent law facilitates ties by allowing contributory
infringement suits against competing suppliers of a tied
product. 133 For example, Rohm & Haas owned a patent on a
method for using an unpatented chemical named propanil as a
herbicide. 134 The company effectively tied the sale of propanil
to a license to practice the method by refusing to license any
farmer who obtained propanil from another source. 135 Rohm &
Haas sued a competing manufacturer of propanil for

abstract _id=320961 (calling for anti-circumvention misuse doctrine
comparable to patent and copyright misuse); Jonathan B. Cox, Static Control
Fights

Against

Lexmark,

NEWS

&

OBSERVER,

available

at

http://newsobserver.com/business/story/2281215p-2146345c.html
(March 4,
2003) (noting that an ink cartridge manufacturer filed antitrust counterclaim
against printer manufacturer).
128. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
129. Id. at 513.
130. Id. at 517. The demand for software maintenance, like frequency of
use, is probably correlated with the value of the hardware to the customer.
Price discrimination is achieved by charging more to customers who need a lot
of maintenance, and presumably they are high frequency and high value
customers. See Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at 88.
131. See MAI Systems Corp., 991 F.2d at 517-20.
132. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000). The new provision does not apply to software
maintenance.
133. Patent law once was hostile to such ties but today promotes the use of
ties to combat contributory infringement. The hostility peaked in the 1940s
with cases like Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944),
and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680
(1944). Recent cases have been quite tolerant. See Dawson Chem. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 199-215 (1980).
134. See Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 185.
135. See id. at 186.
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contributory infringement.
The paramount question was
whether the tie was justified as a means of controlling
contributory infringement, or instead was a misuse of the
patent which would have made the patent unenforceable.
Section 271(c) specifies that a person is liable for contributory
infringement if they sell a component of a patented machine, or
a material for use in practicing a patented process. 136 A critical
element of a contributory infringement claim is a showing that
the defendant's product is a non-staple, that is; not suitable for
substantial non-infringing use. 137 Propanil was a non-staple
138
since it had no use except to practice the patented method.
Ties that serve to deter contributory infringement fall into a
safe harbor created in § 271(d) which assures that such a tie is
not misuse. 139 Applying § 271(c) and (d) the Court found
Dawson Chemical's sale of propanil was contributory patent
40
infringement and there was no patent misuse. 1
The diverse marketing practices discussed in this Part are
linked by the notion that they can all be used to implement
price discrimination based on frequency of use. 14 1 Many of the
136. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000). If there is no underlying infringement, then
there can be no contributory infringement. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1961). Also, the defendant must
have knowledge of the patent infringement not just knowledge of the sort of
use that end users engage in. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488-93 (1964).
137. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
138. See Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 185-86.
139. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d). If the tie is not designed to enforce rights against
contributory infringement, then it is judged by normal misuse standards
which mirror antitrust standards applied to ties. See Virginia Panel Corp. v.
MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 869 (1997); HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6,
§ 3.3.b.1.
140. See Dawson Chem., 448 U.S. at 218-23.
141. The restraints discussed in this part have many other possible uses.
Tying arrangements promote efficiency in a variety of ways. They serve a
quality control function. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 21.2a.
Information about frequency of use helps a lessor properly maintain leased
equipment. Id. § 21.2e. Usage charges help diffuse something economists call
the "adverse selection problem." See TIROLE, supra note 100, at 109. A
potential user who is unsure about the value of a new technology can be
reassured by an arrangement that requires payment only if he actually uses
the product. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 21.2e. Further, strong IP
protection of design interfaces allows the producer of the tying product to
license competing manufacturers of the tied product and maintain control over
the price of the tied product in order to mitigate pricing externalities facing
tied product suppliers. See Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging
Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 615, 616-20 (2000).
Tying arrangements also pose risks of anticompetitive harm. The main
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normative issues raised in the context of type of use restrictions
and price discrimination apply here. For example, the output
effect of usage based pricing can be positive or negative.
Output based pricing tends to draw new customers into a
market, specifically, customers who are infrequent users who
are attracted by the relatively low price charged for infrequent
use. Consumption tends to fall among current customers who
formerly consumed as much as they wanted, and now face a
42
positive price for each additional use. 1
An important and difficult policy issue concerns
coordination of antitrust and IP law to channel frequency of use
pricing
toward socially advantageous
implementation
methods. 43 Some methods are prohibited by antitrust and
misuse law. 144 Sellers committed to usage based pricing will
choose the most profitable of the permissible methods; their
choice will depend on the way IP law affects the cost of various
methods. IP encourages product design ties by protecting
interfaces with patents, trade secret law, and anticircumvention law. It discourages design ties by treating
reverse engineering as lawful under copyright and trade secret
law. 45 Patent law encourages ties involving non-staples and
hazards are foreclosure and promotion of collusion. See HOVENKAMP ET AL.,
supra note 6, § 21.3c-d. The law governing product compatibility and reverse
engineering should attend closely to anticompetitive hazards. See Pamela
Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer Programsand Other Copyrightable Works
in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 49, 86-98 (1993). Copyright protection should be limited so copyright
holders cannot expand their copyright software protection to related markets.
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1588-90 (2002) (evaluating the social welfare
effect of reverse engineering in terms of incentive to innovate, incentive for
follow-on innovation, price, and wasted cost).
142. See Meurer, PriceDiscrimination,supra note 13, at 125-26.
143. An interesting question is whether the law should encourage IP
owners to choose software interfaces to implement metering, because it is
cheaper than using physical interfaces.
144. Antitrust law regulates contractual tying more closely than
technological tying. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 21.5b2 (noting
that most ties cannot be challenged under section 1 of the Sherman Act, or
section 3 of the Clayton Act, and they are difficult to invalidate under section 2
of the Sherman Act).
145. There is a conflict between the circuits regarding contracts that
prohibit reverse engineering. The Fifth Circuit preempted a term that
prohibited reverse engineering under the copyright statute. See Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988). The Federal Circuit,
however, refused to apply preemption in a similar setting. See Bowers v.
Baystate Techs., 302 F.3d 1344, 1348-51 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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copyright law encourages direct frequency of use pricing by
146
making temporary digital copies infringing.
The appropriate scope of the contributory infringement
47
doctrine is another crucial policy issue facing IP law.
Liability attaches to defendants who sell a product or
component that is not capable of a substantial non-infringing
use. The scope of the doctrine can be adjusted by narrow or
148
broad interpretation of the terms capable of and substantial.
Broader scope encourages usage -based pricing, makes
enforcement easier, and increases the value of a patent or
copyright. Narrower scope encourages sale of the defendant's
product, and reduces rent-seeking IP litigation.
The
contributory infringement doctrine provides a social benefit by
reducing enforcement costs. A process patent, like the one in
Dawson Chemical, is difficult to enforce when practice of the
process is easy to hide. 4 9 Patent law eases the enforcement
burden for processes that consume a non-staple input (like
propanil) because sales of the input are difficult to hide and can
be targeted for enforcement action by the patent owner. 50 The
doctrine needs to be limited in order to prevent over-rewarding
patentees and shifting too much of the cost of enforcement to
146. See supra text accompanying notes 130-42.
147. See Hodosh v. Block Drug Co., 833 F.2d 1575, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(defining non-staple in patent law); Stacey L. Dogan, Is Napster a VCR? The
Implications of Sony for Napster and Other Internet Technologies, 52
HASTINGS L.J. 939, 940 (2001).
[W]e have little idea of what the copyright staple article of commerce
doctrine means. Neither the Supreme Court nor subsequent lower
court decisions have elucidated what kinds of products or services can
qualify as staple articles of commerce, nor have they provided a
framework for deciding whether such an article has a substantial
non-infringing use.
Id.
148. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
434-42 (1984). The term substantial is not clearly defined, but apparently it
means something less stringent than a requirement that the majority of uses
are non-infringing. Id. at 490-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Further, the
phrase capable of indicates that future non-infringing uses are sufficient to
escape liability. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1021
(9th Cir. 2001).
149. See Dawson Chem. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980);
Michael A. Shimokaji, Inducement and ContributoryInfringement Theories to
Regulate Pre-PatentIssuance Activity, 37 IDEA 571, 586 (1997).
150. Additional enforcement benefits arise because the patent owner can
reduce the number of suits required for effective enforcement and because the
smaller profit from suing direct infringers sometimes makes those suits
unprofitable.
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third parties. 15 1 An overly broad doctrine also creates the
danger that the seller of a staple product could be exploited
152
through an opportunistic patent or copyright suit.
IV. REPAIR AND MODIFICATION
It is not unusual in IP protected markets for sellers to
make strategic decisions about the durability of their products.
Naturally, they make product design decisions that affect
product durability, but sellers also use vertical restraints to
control the economic life of a product. Specifically, they can use
contract and IP law to restrict or prohibit user repair or
modification-the effect of these restrictions is to stop users
from extending the economic life of their products. These
restrictions can be profitable in three different ways. First,
they help the seller control frequency of use and implement
price discrimination. Second, they help the seller suppress the
second-hand market. And third, they help the seller maintain
a monopoly sales price.
The previous Part explained that sellers often use the sale
of a tied product to measure the frequency of use of a tying
product. Buyers can thwart this strategy by reusing the tied
product. Sellers can respond by making it difficult to reuse the
tied product. Such a struggle apparently is taking place in the
printer market. 153 Printer companies tie the sale of ink
cartridges to printers because cartridge sales are a good
151. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc., 911
F.2d 670, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1990). When an item that is sold to the public might
have non-infringing as well as infringing uses, "the public interest in access to
that article of commerce is necessarily implicated." Id. (citing Sony Am. Corp.,
464 U.S. at 440); see also Dogan, supra note 147, at 942 (advocating an
approach that focuses on consumer access to markets outside the scope of the
copyright). But see BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 146-49, 153-54 (approving cases
finding that divisibility of the right to control use implies that tying a staple
article of commerce to a patent license is acceptable). When enforcement costs
are shifted from IP owners to third parties they might act as a tax on socially
valuable new technology that incidentally facilitates IP infringement. See Dan
L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 176 (1999)
(suggesting that the law makes us careful not to discourage technological
progress).
152. See Meurer, supra note 25, at 5.
153. See Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil, 123 F.3d 1445, 1446
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Becker, supra note 126 ("Printer makers have employed a
variety of technological means in recent years to undercut the market for
recycled toner and ink cartridges, which typically sell for much less than
original items. Most printer makers sell their printers at or near cost, making
their profit from sales of supplies.").
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measure of frequency of use.
Printer companies have
discouraged third party cartridge suppliers by making it
difficult to design a compatible cartridge and by enforcing
copyright and patent rights. 154 Buyers responded by simply
refilling empty cartridges with ink. Hewlett Packard countered
by designing cartridges to be non-refillable. 155 A company
named Repeat-O-Type Stencil purchased HP ink cartridges,
modified them so that they could be refilled, and sold them to
the public. 56
HP sued Repeat-O-Type for patent
infringement. 157 The Federal Circuit ruled against HP and
158
held the modification was not infringing.
Sellers also limit reuse of a product outside the tying
context. Medical device makers often limit buyers to a single
use of a product even though the product could be refurbished
and reused. 159 The most likely rationale is to discourage the
development of a second-hand market. 160 Mallinckrodt Inc. v.
Medipart Inc.16 1 featured a patented medical device used to
deliver mist to the lungs of patients. 162 The patent owner
marked the device: "For Single Use Only." 163 The defendant
salvaged used devices, sterilized the main parts and resold
them. 64 The court treated the label as a valid contract term
and enforced the restriction despite an objection that the
65
restriction violated the exhaustion doctrine. 1
Even if a patent owner fails to impose a contractual
restraint on reuse, it can still prohibit certain kinds of reuse
that are characterized as infringing reconstruction. In Cotton154.

See Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d

at

1448-50

(listing patent

and

trademark infringement claims); Brief of Amicus Curiae Law Professors at 6,
Lexmark, Int'l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., (E.D. Ky 2003) (No. 02571-KSF).
155. See Hewlett-Packard, 123 F.3d at 1448.
156. Id. at 1484.
157. Id. at 1449.
158. Id. at 1454-55.
159. See, e.g., Karl Storz Endoscopy-America Inc. v. Surgical Techs. Inc.,
285 F.3d 848, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing summary judgment for

defendant

because reconstruction of medical device

might

constitute

trademark infringement).
160. See id. at 852-53. This restriction could also be valuable to the seller
as a way to monitor frequency of use.

161.

976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

162.
163.

Id. at 701.
Id. at 702.

164. Id.
165. Id. at 709.

1900

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol 87:1871

Tie Co. v. Simmons 166 the patent owner sold patented metal
bands used to tie bales of cotton. 67 When the cotton bales
arrived at the cotton mill the bands were cut.168 The defendant
collected and recycled the bands. 169 The Court held this was
infringing reconstruction. 170
When courts want to limit the patent owner's control over
reuse they characterize a defendant's actions as repair rather
than reconstruction. 171 Kendall Co. v. Progressive Medical
Tech., Inc. 172 illustrates noninfringing repair. The patent
covered a medical device that creates pressure used to treat
and prevent deep vein thrombosis. 173 The invention comprises
a pump, tube, and pressure sleeve. 174 The pressure sleeve is
marked: "For Single Use Only." 175 The defendant made and
sold replacement sleeves. 176 The combination of the old tube
and pump with the replacement sleeves was not reconstruction
77
of the invention, rather it was noninfringing repair.1
Sellers restrict repair of some patented devices even when
tying and second-hand markets are not present.
Such
restrictions may be necessary to support a high sale price that
is predicated on the belief that consumers will return to
purchase a replacement from the patent owner when the device
they currently own reaches an optimal retirement age. Ideally,
a seller should encourage users to properly maintain a device to
prolong its life, and discourage inefficient repairs and
modifications.
A buyer might practice inefficient repair
because the seller uses its market power to set the replacement
price above the cost of the replacement. 178 This theory justifies
166.
167.
168.

106 U.S. 89 (1882).
See id. at 89.
Id. at 91.

169.
170.

See id.
Id. at 95.

171.

Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction,

and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 424-

25 (1999).
172. 85 F.3d 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
173. Id. at 1571.
174.

Id.

175.

Id. at 1572.

176.
177.
178.

Id.
See id. at 1574-76.
Let me illustrate this result with an example. Suppose that there are

six years remaining in the term of the patent that protects a durable good, and
suppose there is no discounting of future costs and benefits. The good provides
a benefit of $5 for each year of use. It costs $4 to make a new good, and the
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certain contractual restrictions on repair and also the practice
of characterizing certain activities as infringing reconstruction
even though that might easily be characterized as repair
instead.

79

In Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 18° the defendant placed
new tips on drill bits covered by plaintiffs drill patent. Even
though the drill tip was not separately patented, the court
ruled this was infringing reconstruction.1 8s
The court
distinguished and permitted users to sharpen the tip when it
becomes dull. 182 The court emphasized that sharpening a dull
tip is a routine practice, but replacing a tip is difficult and

good lasts for two years if it is not repaired. The user can repair the good at a
cost of $3 and extend its life by one year, so a repaired good lasts a total of
three years. In this setting, repair is inefficient because it costs $3 to get a
year of service from a good through repair, but only $4/$2 = $2 to get a year of
service from manufacture of a new good. If the user is not allowed to repair
the good, then the patent owner will charge $10 for the good, and a user would
make three purchases over the remaining six years of the patent. The patent
owner would earn a profit of $10 - $4 = $6 on each sale for a total profit of $18
from each user.
If the user is allowed to repair the good, then the seller will earn a smaller
total profit, and the user will engage in inefficient repair. At the previous
price of $10, a user would only make two purchases instead of three over the
remaining patent term. The user would repair the good at the end of the
second year by paying the repair cost of $4. By making repairs, the user limits
her total costs over the six years to $2($10) + $2($3) = $26, the cost of two
purchases and two repairs. This is smaller than the cost of three purchases,
and it delivers the same benefit. If the patent owner charged a price of $10 it
would get a profit from each user of $12 not $18, because it would make two
sales not three. The patent owner actually maximizes its profit by raising the
price to $12. Users make two purchases and perform two repairs. The patent
owner earns a profit of $12 - $4 = $8 on each sale for a total profit of $16 from
each user. If the patent owner wanted to induce users to make three
purchases and forego inefficient repair, it would have to cut the price to $6.
The patent owner, however, would not choose such a low price because it gives
a profit of only $6 - $4 = $2 on each sale for a total profit of $6 from each user.
179. Compare Sandvik Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co., 121 F.3d 669, 674 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (finding that the replacement of drill tip is infringing), with Aro Mfg. Co.
v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961) (finding that the
replacement of fabric in patented roof for convertible car is not infringing).
Reconstruction occurs when a spent article is made new. Relevant factors
include: whether some component has a shorter useful life than the article as
a whole; how the article is designed; the existence of a market to make or
service a part; and the nature of the defendant's actions. See Sandvik, 121
F.3d at 673.
180. 121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
181. Id. at 674.
182. Id.
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expensive. 183 Users only place a new tip on a drill when it is no
longer possible to sharpen the old tip properly. This distinction
makes economic sense if the savings that results from deferring
the manufacture of a new drill are smaller than the cost of
replacing a tip and larger than the cost of sharpening a tip. 84
Software publishers often prohibit software modification.
This vertical restraint prevents users from extending the
economic life of the software and may have a similar effect to
restraints on the repair of patented products. 85 Some users
modify software so they can add new features or move it to a
new platform.186 The seller might prefer the user buy a new
version of the software rather than modify an old version. The
adaptation right in copyright law applies to software
modifications and makes them infringing, 8 7 but the right is
significantly constrained by § 117188 and the fair use
doctrine. 8 9 Despite these limitations on the adaptation right,
183. Id. at 673.
184. This approach could reach similar outcomes to the approach proposed
by Janis. He recommends that the reasonable expectations of the parties
should guide the characterization of an activity as repair or reconstruction.
See Janis, supra note 171, at 428, 485. The approaches coincide if the parties
expectations are simply that repair will be undertaken if and only if it is
efficient.
185. See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 86; cf CARL
SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE
NETWORK ECONOMY 193 (1999) (discussing strategy used for software
upgrades).
186. See Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at 86.
187. See Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1110-12 (9th Cir.
1998); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 923 (1983).
188. See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2000) (allowing adaptation required as an
essential step in use of a computer program or adaptation for archival
purposes); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding an act which allows sellers to prohibit adaptation rights of
software conflicts with the rights of users under § 117 and is federally
preempted); Pamela Samuelson, Comparing U.S. and EC Copyright Protection
for Computer Programs:Are They More Different Than They Seem?, 13 J.L. &
COM. 279, 284 (1994) (stating that § 117 allows modification to run a program
on a different machine).
189. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Lewis Galoob Toys Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
964 F.2d 965, 970-72 (9th Cir. 1992). The defendant Galoob was accused of
contributory infringement for making and selling devices that enable
Nintendo videogame users to create unauthorized derivative works. See id. at
967. Galoob manufactured a device called the Game Genie that was used to
change features of the games. Id. The court denied that a derivative work
existed and in the alternative applied the fair use doctrine. Id. at 967-72. But
see Micro Star, 154 F.3d at 1113.
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contract terms that restrict modification are likely to be
enforced. 190
Vertical restraints affecting repair and modification help
sellers control the economic life of their products. Policy
analysis of these restraints raises two interesting questions.
First, do the restraints promote efficient repair and
modification or instead wasteful obsolescence? Second, are the
restraints necessary to assure IP owners capture an adequate
reward in durable product markets?
IP owners would argue that restraints on reconstruction
encourage efficient repair, and help support the high profit
level required to induce innovation. The ability to block reuse
eases the threat of competition from the secondary market.' 9'
The ability to control effective product life helps sellers escape
a curse on durable product monopolists that prevents them
from charging a monopoly price. Ronald Coase conjectured,
and microeconomists later confirmed, that durable product
monopolists have trouble sustaining a price above the
competitive price, because they have trouble committing
themselves to not price discriminate over time. 192 The prospect
that price will fall over time discourages high valuation
consumers from making an early purchase at a high price, and
thus the seller's inability to commit to a high price leads to a
relatively low initial price. 193 One solution requires the seller
194
to convert the durable product into a perishable product.
Commitment to charge a high price is no longer a problem
because high valuation users are repeatedly in the market
along with all other users. The restraints discussed in this part
have the effect of making products less durable, and they might
be motivated by a desire to escape the Coase conjecture. 195
190. See Samuelson, supra note 188, at 284 (noting that such terms are
more likely to be enforced in the United States than in Europe).
191.

See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 79-80

(1988) (demonstrating that the amount of the profit earned by a monopolist
depends on the ease of recycling its output).
192. See id. at 72-74, 80-87 (1988) (explaining the Coase conjecture).
193. Thus, a durable good monopolist essentially "creates his own
competition." Id.
194. See id. at 86-87. For example, West Publishing has largely shifted
from making law books, a durable good, to providing subscription databases.
195. Cf. John Wiley et al., The Leasing Monopolist, 37 UCLA L. REV. 693,
694-96 (1990). This argument can be used to defend the position that massmarketed software is licensed not sold. For a discussion of the debate about
whether mass-marketed software should be characterized as licensed or sold,
see Nimmer et al., supra note 31.
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IP users would object that some restraints on repair and
modification are socially harmful.
These arguments are
plausible in cases in which a second-hand market would
increase output or when inefficient product life choices are
made to overcome the Coase conjecture or support frequency of
use pricing or some other form of price discrimination. 196 To
make these objections convincing IP users should also argue
that profit and incentive to innovate would not be harmed too
much by constraining repair and modification restraints.
V. PACKAGES
IP owners sometimes insist that buyers and licensees take
a package of products or licenses. Usually mandatory packages
are profitable because they reduce enforcement or other
transaction costs, or because they implement price
discrimination. 197 The convenience of packaging is easy to see
when IP owners hold a large portfolio of patents or copyrights.
A radio patent pool held 570 patents and 200 applications. 98
ASCAP and BMI, the two largest music performance rights
organizations, each control millions of music copyrights. 99 The
role of packaging in price discrimination is a little more to
difficult to see.
An example illustrates how packaging helps a seller
achieve price discrimination. Suppose a company owns patents
A and B that are of interest to two potential licensees X and Y.
Suppose X would be willing to pay $2 for a license to A and $4
for a license to B. Suppose Y would be willing to pay $5 for a
license to A and $3 for a license to B. If the patent owner sets
separate fees for the licenses the price of A would be $5 and the
price of B would be $3. Firm X would not take a license to A,
and revenue would be $5 from patent A plus $6 from patent B
for a total of $11. If the patent owner offered a package of A
and B for a price of $6, then both X and Y would accept the
package and the patent owner would have a revenue of $12.

196.

See Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at 101-02.

197. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 13-16 (1979) (noting that blanket music licenses save on enforcement
and transaction costs); Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 11
(stating that ASCAP and BMI practice price discrimination).
198. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S.

827, 829 (1950).
199. See
BMI
and ASCAP
Reject
Licensing Legislation,
http://www.ascap. com/press/1998/legislation-100898.html (Oct. 28, 1998).

at
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Thus, the package gives more revenue to the patent owner and
200
increases diffusion of the technology.
Unlike the other vertical restraints discussed in this
Article, IP law regulates packaging pretty much the same way
that antitrust does. 20 1 The main tool of IP oversight is the
misuse doctrine which follows antitrust doctrine regarding
packaging quite closely. 20 2 The convenience of packaging
makes courts reluctant to find antitrust liability20 3 or apply the
misuse doctrine. 20 4 Courts have displayed some hostility
205
toward packaging that implemented price discrimination,
but that attitude is probably fading. 20 6 Only rare packaging
cases where the plaintiff demonstrates a foreclosure or
collusion facilitating effect are likely to violate antitrust laws or
20 7
the misuse doctrine.

200. It is also possible to construct examples such that packaging increases
profit but reduces total output. Suppose firm Z is added to the market as a
potential licensee and it values A at $5/3 and B at $2. The optimal price for a
package is still $6 which yields the same revenue of $12. If, however, the
patent owner is required to set separate royalty rates, then the optimal rate
for A is $5/3 and the optimal rate for B is $2 which yields a total revenue of
$11. Thus, total revenue (or profit) declines, but output grows because firm Z
takes the licenses when they are priced separately, but not when they are
offered as a package.
201. See Meurer, Price Discrimination, supra note 13, at 121, 124
(describing limited circumstances in which copyright facilitates packaging).
202. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.3a.
203. See Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-23 (1979)
(approving BMI's licensing practices as a convenient means of marketing and
enforcing public performance licenses).
204. See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 339 U.S.
827, 830-34 (1950) (finding no misuse because the royalty scheme achieved
simplicity in accounting and was done for the convenience of the parties).
205. See Broadcast Music Inc., 441 U.S. at 30-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the blanket license implemented harmful price discrimination);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 134-35 (1969);
United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 39 (1962).
206. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 22.6 (disapproving antitrust
oversight of packaging designed to price discriminate).
207. See id. § 22.4a-b; Barry J. Nalebuff, Bundling, at 2 (Yale ICF Working
Paper
Series
No.
99-14) at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/
991013301.pdf? abstractid=185193 (Nov. 22, 1999) (packaging may cause
exclusion when buyers have positively correlated valuations); Yannis Bakos &
Erik Brynjolfsson, Bundling and Competition on the Internet, at
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-bakos/bci.pdf (April 1999) (bundling may deter
entry into markets for digital content).
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VI. EXIT
IP regulation of exit restraints is broader than antitrust
regulation, but like packaging restraints, the IP approach to
exit restraints approximates the antitrust approach. 208 Exit
restraints arise when contracting parties commit to a long-term
relationship and commit not to deal with others.
Such
commitments can be an efficient way to encourage parties to
invest in a relationship, but they occasionally pose a danger to
competition. 20 9 That danger is elevated when one of the parties
2 10
owns patents or copyrights that might lead to market power.
Patent law regulates certain restraints that impede a licensee's
ability to exit his relationship with a patent owner through the
misuse and preemption doctrines. 2 11 Copyright law has
enacted compulsory licenses to moderate the danger that
exclusive licenses can be used to create market power in
downstream markets.
Patent law condemns as misuse contract terms that extend
the patent beyond its expiration date. 2 12 This policy originates
in Brulotte, a case in which the patentee sold a hop picking
machine to farmers under a contract which required royalty
payments after the patents covering the machine had
expired. 213 Misuse also requires that when a patent owner
licenses a package of IP rights containing U.S. patents the
royalty rate must be reduced as patents in the package
214
expire.
208. The goals pursued in Brulotte v, Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964) and
Lear Inc., v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 663-64 (1969), discussed infra in notes 21219 and accompanying text, match antitrust goals, but derive from patent law
rather than antitrust. See HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 23.2c.
209. See United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 874 (D. Md. 1916)
(describing how a canning company secured domination of a market by

contracing for the entire output of canning machine manufacturers, and also
for assignment or exclusive licensing of their patents).
210. See id.
211. See Michael J. Meurer, Note, An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms
in Patent Licenses, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1198, 1201-11 (1983) (reviewing judicial

restrictions on royalty terms).
212. HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 3.3b3.
213. 379 U.S. at 29.
214. See Meehan v. PPG Indus., 802 F.2d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding
that royalty payments on United States sales under package license

containing Canadian, American, and British patents must end when the
American patent expires); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365, 1373

(11th Cir. 1983) (finding that royalty payments must fall under package
license containing trade secrets and patents when patents expire)- cf. Boggild
v. Kenner Prods., 776 F.2d 1315, 1320-21 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding misuse in
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Patent law preempts contract terms that purport to require
royalties on an invalid patent. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 2 15 Lear
licensed a patented gyroscope from Adkins. 21 6 ,Lear stopped
making royalty payments because it believed the patent was
invalid, and Adkins brought suit. 217 The Supreme Court
overturned a contract doctrine that estopped licensees from
challenging the validity of a patent because patent law
preempted the contract doctrine.2 18 Later cases extended
preemption to various contract terms that discourage validity
2 19
challenges.
In copyright protected markets, important policy concerns
arise with exit restraints that are directed upstream at
assignment agreement that required payments for twenty-five years
regardless of whether patents issued and imposed the same use restrictions
after patent expiration).
215. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
216. Id. at 655.
217. Id. at 655-56.
218. Id. at 670-71.
219. See Bus. Forms Finishing Serv., Inc. v. Carson, 452 F.2d 70, 75 (7th
Cir. 1971) (holding defendant's agreement to accept the validity of plaintiffs
patent unenforceable); Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State
Adver., 444 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusing to enforce a covenant in
which the licensee agreed not to contest the validity of the patents); Timely
Prods, Inc. v. Costanzo, 465 F. Supp. 91, 99 (D. Conn. 1979) (finding a
contractual arrangement in which the license would pay the same royalty rate
whether or not the patent was valid contrary to the policies of federal patent
law, and therefore unenforceable). Just before the creation of the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court signaled a retreat from these cases in Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 266 (1979).
A patent applicant
negotiated a license calling for five percent royalties that would be reduced to
two and one half percent if a patent did not issue within five years. Id. at 25960. The Court enforced the contract despite the tension with Brulotte and
Lear. See id. at 264-66.
Brulotte and Lear are not popular with the Federal Circuit. See Flex-Foot,
Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (upholding a
settlement agreement not to challenge a patent's validity); Studiengesellschaft
Kohle m.b.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding
that "[niothing in this license made payment of royalties contingent on the
validity of [a] patent," and describing Lear as "echo[ing] from a past era of
skepticism over intellectual property principles"); Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co.,
947 F.2d 469, 476-77 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (enforcing a consent decree on grounds
that Lear does not abrogate principles of res judicata); Hemstreet v. Spiegel,
Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350-51 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (enforcing a litigation settlement to
pay royalties regardless of enforceability, of patent claims); Universal Gym
Equip., Inc. v. ERWA Exercise Equip., Ltd., 827 F.2d 1542, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (upholding a contract to pay royalties for use of an unpatented design).
As a result, careful contract drafting usually avoids the threat of misuse or
preemption.
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creators. An interesting example comes from the player piano
industry. In early twentieth century America, piano rolls were
a major source of revenue for the music industry. 220 A firm
named the Aeolian Company dominated the market for piano
rolls and for player pianos. 22' In the first decade of the century,
Aeolian signed deals with several music publishers that
granted Aeolian the exclusive right to make piano rolls using
the songs in their catalogues. 222 Interestingly, these contracts
were negotiated when the player piano was a relatively new
technology, and there was uncertainty whether piano roll
makers needed copyright permission. The Aeolian contracts
were contingent on the courts or Congress establishing that
piano rolls were subject to music composition copyrights. The
Supreme Court decided piano rolls were not infringing copies
because they were not fixed within the meaning of the 1870
Copyright Act. 223 Composers and music publishers lobbied
Congress to make piano rolls subject to copyright law, and
partially succeeded; Congress extended copyright law to cover
mechanical reproductions of music. 224 Player piano and piano
roll competitors of Aeolian also lobbied Congress seeking relief
from the market power Aeolian would get from its exclusive
contracts. Congress responded by combining the mechanical
reproduction right with a compulsory license provision that
effectively nullified the exclusionary term in the Aeolian

220. See Nimbus Records, Grand Piano-A Technical Outline of the
Reproducing Piano, at http://www.wyastone.co.uk/nrl/gp-tech.html
(last
visited Feb. 28, 2003) ("Between 1915 and 1930 the Reproducing Piano was
very big business.").
221. Id. ("In its peak year, 1925, more than 192,000 domestic instruments

were manufactured by the Aeolian Company in the USA, with a total sales
value of $59,000,000."). But see Robert P. Merges, Contractinginto Liability
Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84
CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1309 (1996) (questioning whether Aeolian Company

dominated the player piano industry around the time of the 1909 copyright
revisions).
222. See Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Goodbye to Madonna's
American Pie: Why Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put to Rest,

19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 290 (2001). Furthermore, the company
"made every effort to perfect and enhance their invention, and throughout this
period they kept the most famous pianists under contract." Nimbus Records,
supra note 220.
223.

See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 15-18

(1908).
224.

See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBURG TO

THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 65-67 (1994); Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation
and Technological Change, 68 ORE. L. REV. 275 (1989).
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contracts. 225
IP regulation of exit restraints presents the same basic
policy concerns presented by antitrust regulation. 226 Certain
exit restraints are used to deter entry or raise the costs of
competing with the firm that imposes the restraints, but most
exit restraints advance some efficiency goal. 227 The difficult
question is how to deter harmful restraints without
discouraging efficient restraints. For example, restraints like
those in Brulotte might have an anticompetitive effect similar
to certain long-term requirements contracts, 228 or they might
simply implement a convenient payment method for liquidity
constrained users. 229 Similarly, restrictions on challenges to
the validity of a patent might preserve an entry barrier based
on an invalid patent, but they also promote efficient settlement
of litigation. 230 The compulsory licensing approach used in
copyright is quite difficult to manage effectively because of the
twin problems of deciding when a compulsory license is

225. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 224, at 66-67. The relevant provision of
the current copyright statute is 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000), which gives a
compulsory license to a music composition copyright to anyone who
independently records a composition after the first authorized copy is released.
See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Blacked-Out Professional Team
Sporting Event Telecasts (PTSETS): Using Copyright Law to Mitigate
Monopolistic Behavior, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 417-428 (1995) (discussing
Aeolian and more recent examples of copyright compulsory licenses as tools for
mitigating harm caused by the exercise of market power).
226. Antitrust regulates forced exclusive dealing on principles similar to
those followed in Brulotte and its progeny. For a discussion of antitrust
regulation of exclusive dealing in IP protected markets, see generally
HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, at §§ 21.3c, 21.7c (discussing foreclosure and
other social harms, and competitive rationales). Several scholars at this
Symposium discuss the issues and implications of Lear on antitrust regulation
of the patent settlement. See generally Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the
"PresumptiveIllegality" Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving
Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley, 87
MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2003); Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003);
Maureen A. O'Rourke & Joseph F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent
Settlements: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis& Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV.
1767 (2003).
227. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 8, § 7.3b.
228. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32-33 (1964).
229. See BOWMAN, supra note 6, at 227-38; Meurer, supra note 211, at
1217-22 (asserting that the leveraging argument in Brulotte is not persuasive).
230. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, DethroningLear: Licensee Estoppel and
the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 718-24 (1986); Meurer, supra
note 211, at 1209.
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appropriate, and fixing an appropriate royalty rate. 231

CONCLUSION
IP law is much more active than antitrust law in
232
regulating vertical restraints in IP protected markets.
Vertical restraints are implemented through contract, IP
enforcement, and product design. Antitrust regulates vertical
restraints by condemning contract terms that are judged
anticompetitive.
IP law often takes a similar approach,
condemning certain contract terms through application of the

misuse and preemption doctrines.
But IP law has two
additional means of influencing contract based restrictions. It
encourages vertical restrictions by bolstering contract remedies
with IP remedies when a user violates a use restriction, and it
provides default terms to fill incomplete contracts.
Furthermore, IP facilitates vertical restraints by granting IP
rights against strangers who might interfere with the
restraints by playing the role of arbitrageur or materially
assisting an act of infringement. IP law inevitably must be
more active than antitrust in regulating vertical restraints-

the law must specify rules about what kinds of uses are
231. See Merges, supra note 221, at 1308-16 (criticizing the mechanical
license because the license fee is set without regard to market forces).
232. An important topic for future research is the question of how IP
regulates horizontal restraints compared to antitrust law. My impression is
that the differences are not as striking as they are in the case of vertical
restraints. Some examples of intellectual property law doctrines that regulate
horizontal competition include: the copyright fair use doctrine which
encourages reverse engineering, see, e.g., Sega Enter. v. Accolade Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1520-22 (9th Cir. 1992); the idea-expression dichotomy, see, e.g.,
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100-04 (1879); the merger doctrine and related
copyright doctrines that preclude copyright protection of functional aspects of
computer programs, see, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d
807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided Court, 116 S.Ct. 804, 81419 (1996); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12 (2d
Cir. 1992); SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 24, § 15.4b (noting the role of
copyright law in regulating competition in the computer industry); the patent
statutory bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which protects firms from holdup based on a patent suit when the invention appears to be in the public
domain, see, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61-62 (Ct. Cl.
1981); the first inventor defense against business method patent infringement,
see, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 273; the trademark doctrines allowing fair use, see, e.g.,
Zatarain's,Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc. 698 F.2d 786, 791-92 (5th Cir.
1983), and invalidating generic marks, see, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co., v.
Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 100-02 (2d Cir. 1989); and the
functionality defense against trade dress infringement, see, e.g., Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209-16 (2000).
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infringing.
Product design choices implement vertical restraints
through technological ties. Antitrust only weakly regulates
product design decisions. Courts are reluctant to recognize
tying claims based on product design choices because they fear
they will discourage socially valuable innovation. In contrast,
IP law actively regulates technological ties, it encourages ties
by protecting product interfaces through patent, trade secret,
and anticircumvention law, and it discourages ties by
promoting reverse engineering intended to discover product
compatibility requirements.
Furthermore, patent and
copyright promote price discrimination by restricting product
modifications that aid arbitrage against price discrimination.
Reviewing six types of vertical restraints, it appears that
IP law offers more extensive regulation of every type except
perhaps packaging and exit. Regulation of packaging through
patent misuse basically mimics antitrust regulation of
packaging. 23 3 Patent law oversight of exit restraints comprises
the rules from Brulotte against post-expiration royalties and
from Lear against terms that prevent patent challenges.
Neither patent nor antitrust courts are likely to expand these
rules; courts are disposed to believe exit restraints enhance
efficiency and are unlikely to condemn other exit restraints
234
absent a strong showing of harm to competition.
IP law regulates the other four types of restraints more
extensively than antitrust because: the rent-seeking costs of
opportunistic and anticompetitive litigation are smaller; it uses
regulatory instruments other than simple prohibitions; and it
shows greater concern about the welfare effect of end use
restrictions. IP doctrines that discourage vertical restraints
generally cause smaller rent-seeking problems than antitrust
doctrines with a similar effect.
IP rules that provide
background entitlements are relatively clear compared to
antitrust rules which require uncertain rule of reason analysis.
Furthermore, IP prohibitions that are implemented through
233. Copyright law facilitates packaging to a small degree by impeding
unbundling of a package. See Meurer, Price Discrimination,supra note 13, at
120-21.
234. Recent antitrust "cases suggest a skepticism toward claims of forced
exclusive dealing, restricting recovery to cases in which the defendant has
foreclosed a substantial percentage of the market." See HOVENKAMP, supra
note 58, § 7.3d. The Federal Circuit appears hostile to Brulotte and Lear and
reads them narrowly. See Dreyfuss, supra note 230, at 693-707; supra note
219.
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preemption or misuse do not give rise to treble damages, and
can only be used defensively. In contrast, broad antitrust
regulation of vertical restraints creates a threat of
opportunistic suits because of uncertainty, the lure of treble
damages, and the possibility of initiating a suit against a
vulnerable defendant. 235 The greater reach and wider policy
concerns of IP law are reflected in doctrines that affect price
discrimination, product durability, and sharing. Many IP
doctrines promote or discourage price discrimination by
tolerating or discouraging arbitrage. Certain IP doctrines
regulate repair and modification and affect the profit that can
be earned by IP owners who are durable product monopolists.
Finally, various copyright doctrines encourage or discourage
users from forming coalitions that can bargain more effectively
with copyright owners.

235. But see HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra note 6, § 21.3f (arguing that the
misuse doctrine is applied too aggressively); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual PropertyLicensing, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 111, 145 (1999) (arguing that pre-emption lacks nuance); Mark A.
Lemley, The Economic Irrationalityof the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L.
REV. 1599, 1615-18 (1990) (arguing that misuse overdeters).

